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Federal Jurisdiction: Federal Court Has Power to
Hear Rule 14 Claim by Plaintiff Against Nondiverse
Third Party Defendant
Kroger, an Iowa citizen, brought a wrongful death action in federal district court against a Nebraska corporation,' relying for juris-

diction on diversity of citizenship.2 The defendant filed a third party3

complaint under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
against Owen Equipment and Erection Company (Owen), another
Nebraska corporation. Plaintiff also claimed against Owen under
Rule 14. Thereafter, the original defendant was granted summary
judgment,4 and the case proceeded to trial with only Owen, the third
party defendant, remaining as a defendant. On the third day of trial,
Owen disclosed for the first time that its principal place of business
was in Iowa rather than Nebraska and immediately moved for leave
to file an amended answer asserting lack of diversity jurisdiction.'
The motion was denied, and judgment was subsequently entered for
plaintiff against Owen. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, affirmed, holding that a plaintiff's claim

1. Another Nebraska corporation was originally named as a defendant, but was
dismissed because of a jurisdictional defect, the details of which were not in the record
before the court. Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417, 429 app. (8th
Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 715 (1978) (No. 77-677).
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970), as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a) (West
Supp. 1977).
3. The relevant portion of Rule 14 provides,
(a) When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. At any time after
commencement of the action a defending party, as a third-party plaintiff,
may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party
to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim against him.... The person served with the summons and thirdparty complaint, hereinafter called the third-party defendant, shall make his
defenses to the third-party plaintiff's claim ...

and his counterclaims

against the third-party plaintiff and cross-claims against other third-party
defendants ....

The third-party defendant may also assert any claim

against the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff. The
plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's
claim against the third-party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his defenses ..- and his counterclaims and cross-claims
P, Civ. P. 14(a).
4. See Kroger v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 523 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975).
5. Since corporations are citizens of both the state of their incorporation and the
state in which they maintain their principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)
(1970), Owen was a citizen of both Iowa and Nebraska.
F.
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against a third party defendant is ancillary to the main action when
both claims share "common and interrelated facts" and, as such,
requires no independent jurisdictional support. The lack of diversity
between the plaintiff and the third party defendant did not, therefore, defeat the court's power to hear the claim. Whether jurisdiction
ought to be asserted in such cases, however, was held to be a matter
of judicial discretion, dependent on considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants. Kroger v. Owen
Equipment & Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 715 (1978) (No. 77-677).
The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited by the Constitution
of the United States6 and acts of Congress.! Article III, section 2, of'
the Constitution specifically grants federal courts the power to resolve disputes "between Citizens of different States." Standing
alone, this provision permitr federal courts to hear state law claims
whenever there is diversity of citizenship between at least one defendant and one plaintiff.' Since Strawbridge v. Curtiss,' however, the
constitutional requirement of diversity has been interpreted in light
of the statutory grant of general diversity jurisdiction"0 to require
diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs and all defendants."
This requirement of complete diversity is not absolute, however.
Federal courts may, for example, invoke the judicially constructed
concept of ancillary jurisdiction to hear claims over which neither the
Constitution nor Congress has conferred jurisdiction. The theory of
ancillary jurisdiction derives from the historical power of an equity
court "to bring before [it] all matters necessary to enable it fully to
decide upon the rights of all the parties."' 2 The power of a federal
court to do complete justice between parties who are properly before
6. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §2.
7. It is "well established ... that federal courts, as opposed to state trial courts
of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress."
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). Statutes relating to the federal courts are
codified in title 28 of the United States Code.
8. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967).
9. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (Massachusetts plaintiffs sued defendants from
both Massachusetts and Vermont on a state law claim).
10. The current statutory provision is found at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 1966 &
Supp. 1977).
11. The rule of complete diversity has remained constant through successive
reenactments of the grant of diversity jurisdiction. See Carlsberg Resources Corp. v.
Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1258 (3d Cir. 1977).
12. 1 J. SMITH, TREATISE, ON PRACTICE OF COURT OF CHANCERY 460 (2d ed. 1842)
(1st ed. London 1837); see Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 460 (1860); 1 J.
STORY,

COMMENTARIES

ON EQUITY JURISDICTION AS ADMINISTERED

IN ENGLAND AND

30 n.1 (14th ed. 1918) (1st ed. Boston 1836) ("Where equity has acquired
jurisdiction of a case, it may decide all matters incidentally connected with it. so as
to make a final determination of the whole subject .... ").
AMERICA
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it was recognized by the first Supreme Court decision on ancillary
jurisdiction. 3 Since then, ancillary jurisdiction has been invoked to
permit federal courts to hear claims not otherwise cognizable in a
federal forum when they are brought in aid of or subordinate to principal actions and when the assertion of jurisdiction is necessary to do
complete justice between parties who are already before a federal
court."4
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strongly encourage, and
sometimes require, the assertion of ancillary claims.'5 Nowhere is this
policy more evident than in Rule 14, which permits defendants to
implead third parties and allows plaintiffs to assert against the third
parties "any claim . . . arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter" of the original action." The permissive
language of Rule 14 suggests no jurisdictional limits on third party
actions. 7 Since the Federal Rules do not themselves constitute an
independent basis of federal jurisdiction, however, Rule 14 has generated considerable controversy regarding the reach of federal ancillary jurisdiction. 9
With the exception of the Eighth Circuit in Kroger, federal appellate courts have uniformly taken the position that a plaintiff's
13. In Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860). the Court held that a
federal court sitting in a diversity of citizenship case has the power to permit parties
claiming an interest in the property at issue to intervene although their presence
destroys complete diversity. In so holding, the Court reasoned that
a bill filed on the equity side of the court to restrain or regulate judgments
or suits at law in the same court, and thereby prevent injustice, or an inequitable advantage... is not an original suit, but ancillary and dependent,
supplementary merely to the original suit, out of which it had arisen, and is
maintained without reference to the citizenship or residence of the parties.
Id. at 460.
14. See, e.g., Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222 (1935); Moore v. New York
Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926); White v. Ewing, 159 U.S. 36 (1895); Root v. Woolworth, 150 U.S. 401 (1893).
15. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (compulsory and permissive counterclaims); id. 14
(third party practice); id. 19 (necessary joinder of parties); id. 20 (permissive joinder
of parties); id. 24 (intervention). See generally UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715.724 (1966)
("Under the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of
action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies
is strongly encouraged.")
16. Fa. R. Crv. P. 14(a). A partial text of Rule 14(a) appears in note 3 supra.
17. The authors of Rule 14, however, assumed that a plaintiff's claim against a
third party defendant would require independent jurisdictional support. See Report of
Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, 5 F.R.D. 433, 447-48 (1946).
18. "These ruIs shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
United States district courts or the venue of actions therein." FED. R. Cwv. P. 82.
19. According to Professor Moore, "[m]ore than any other provision of the
Federal Rules, Rule 14 raises troublesome questions with respect to jurisdiction and
3 MooRE's FanvEAL
venue, particularly in diversity of citizenship cases .....
PRACrcE 1 14.25, at 14-491 (2d ed. 1974).
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claim against a third party defendant under Rule 14 must be supported by an independent source of jurisdiction." This position accords with the traditional purpose of ancillary jurisdiction: although
resolution of a plaintiff's claim against a third party defendant may
involve the same facts as the main action, it is not dependent upon
2
the resolution of the controversy between the original parties,
" and
20. See, e.g., Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977); Parker v.
W.W. Moore & Sons, Inc., 528 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1975); McPherson v. Hoffman, 275
F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1960); Patton v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 197 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1952);
Report of Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, 5 F.R.D. 433, 447-48
(1946); Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 1411, 1430-31 (1954).
21. The considerations that militate against asserting ancillary jurisdiction over
a plaintiff's claim against a third party defendant should be contrasted with those in
cases where ancillary jurisdiction is commonly conceded to be appropriate. Consider,
for example, a situation in which a citizen of state X sues a citizen of state Y, who
impleads a third party defendant, also a citizen of state Y The majority rule is that
the lack of diversity between the defendant and the third party defendant is not fatal
to the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the third party action. See 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
14.26, at 14-527 (2d ed. 1974). Since a defendant may bring in a third
party only when the third party "is or may be liable to him for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against him," FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a), resolution of the dispute between
the defendant and the third party defendant depends upon the resolution of the main
action. The court thus has jurisdiction over the subsidiary claim. See, e.g., Dery v.
Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959); Waylander-Peterson Co. v. Great N. Ry., 201 F.2d
408 (8th Cir. 1953); Chestnut Run Fed. Credit Union v. Employers Mut. Life Ins.,
392 F. Supp. 76 (D. Del. 1975); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 377 F. Supp. 1344 (D. Minn. 1974).
Similarly, consider a situation in which a citizen of state X sues a citizen of state
Y, who impleads a third party defendant, also a citizen of state X. In the absence of a
claim by plaintiff against the third party defendant, there is no reason why there must
be diversity of citizenship between plaintiff and third party defendant: "[Tihe plaintiff has no direct concern with [the third party defendant]: the third party is brought
in solely to answer a claim by the defendant that he is or may be liable over to the
defendant, and he cannot be held liable to the plaintiff." 3 Mooa.'s FEDERAL PAcTcE
14.26, at 14-525 to -526 (2d ed. 1974).
When, as in Kroger, the plaintiff asserts a claim directly against the third party
defendant, however, a different issue is presented since the plaintiff's claim does not
depend for its resolution upon the resolution of the main claim. In such cases, the vast
weight of authority contravenes Kroger and requires an independent basis for federal
jurisdiction. See id.
14.27111, at 14-565 to -566, and cases cited therein. As this
Comment suggests, there are strong statutory and policy justifications for the position
taken by the majority of jurisdictions.
A more difficult case is presented, however, when a third party defendant asserts
a claim against the plaintiff. In this situation, the courts disagree with respect to the
power of a federal court to hear the third party's claim against the plaintiff absent an
independent basis of jurisdiction. See id. 14.27[21, at 14-575. Courts that require
such an independent basis reason that this position follows logically from the fact that
an independent jurisdictional ground is required in the converse situation in which a
plaintiff claims against a third party defendant. See, e.g., James King & Son, Inc. v.
Indemnity Ins. Co., 178 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Shverha v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
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the plaintiff's claim cannot be held to fall within a court's authority
to insure "complete justice in the chief controversy."" Therefore,
plaintiffs' claims against third party defendants require independent
jurisdictional support.2 In addition to this theoretical justification for
refusing to hear claims against a third party defendant absent independent jurisdictional support, courts have emphasized that allowing
plaintiffs to litigate such claims might encourage collusion between
plaintiffs and original defendants to bring claims not otherwise cognizable by the federal courts under federal jurisdiction.2
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, frequently defined as "a
species of ancillary jurisdiction,"" is a second method by which the
requirement of complete diversity is sometimes diluted. Pendent jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff joins a state claim, for which there
is no independent jurisdictional support, with a claim brought under
federal question jurisdiction.2 ' The standard governing pendent jurisdiction was set out in UMW v. Gibbs:"
110 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Pa. 1953). As suggested by at least one court, however, the two
situations are distinguishable in a number of ways:
First of all, the plaintiff has the option of selecting the forum where he
believes he can most effectively assert his claims, [sic] he has not been
involuntarily brought to a forum, faced with the prospect of defending himself as best he can under the rules that forum provides, or defending himself
not at all. Since a plaintiff could not initially join a non-diverse defendant.
it is arguable he should not be allowed to do so indirectly by way of a
fortuitous impleader. Moreover, there is the possibility, whether real or fanciful, of collusion between the plaintiff and an overly cooperative defendant
impleading just the right third party. Whatever the merit or demerit of these
reasons, they point to a sufficient difference to require that the application
of ancillary jurisdiction to each type of claim must be decided separately.
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 716 (5th Cir. 1970).
22. Cooperative Transit Co. v. West Penn Elec. Co., 132 F.2d 720. 723 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 318 U.S. 779 (1943).
23. See Note, The Ancillary Concept and the FederalRules, 64 HAnv. L. REv.
968, 974 (1951); Note, Ancillary Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 48 IowA L. Rv.
383, 392 (1963).
24. See, e.g., Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 893.94 (4th
.Cir. 1972); Hoskie v. Prudential Ins. Co., 39 F. Supp. 305, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1941). But
see 3 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 14.27(1], at 14-571 (2d ed. 1974); Note, Rule 14(a)
and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Plaintiff's Claim Against Non-Diverse Third-Party
Defendant, 33 WASH. &.IE L. Rlv. 796, 805-06 (1976); Comment, Pendent andAncillary Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1263,
1283 (1975).
25. Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction,81 HIv. L. Rsv. 657, 657
n.1 (1968).
26. See, eg., UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238
(1933). In Gibbs, for example, the plaintiff brought an action against the United Mine
Workers for violation of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970).
The plaintiff joined with this claim a state common law claim against the Mine
Workers for contract interference. The Court upheld federal jurisdiction over the state
law claim, but reversed on the merits.
27. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever
there is a claim "arising under [the] Constitution, the laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority . . . " and the relationship between that claim and
the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before
the court comprises but one constitutional "case.". . . The state
and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then . . . there is
power in federal courts to hear the whole.n
The Court went on to caution that "pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine
of discretion, not of plaintiff's right. . . . Its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants
''29

In Kroger, the Eighth Circuit became the first federal court of
appeals to allow a plaintiff to assert a claim against a third party
defendant in the absence of independent jurisdictional support." In
so doing, the court incorporated into the standards governing ancillary jurisdiction the power-discretion analysis articulated in Gibbs.
Reading Gibbs as a "'reemphasi[s of] the fundamental principle
that a federal court has jurisdictionalpower to adjudicate the whole
case, i.e., all claims, state or federal, which derive from a common
nucleus of operative facts,' "I' the court reasoned that the Gibbs standard was appropriate to issues of ancillary jurisdiction because the
same considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness
to litigants found to support the assertion of pendent jurisdiction in
Gibbs also apply to the assertion of ancillary jurisdiction." Thus,
"'if [Gibbs signals a] relaxation of the prohibitory rule as to original
joinder of claims and parties, then, consequently its corollary rule
forbidding ancillary jurisdiction of a claim by the plaintiff against the
third-party defendant must also be relaxed.' "3
28. Id. at 725 (citations and footnotes omitted).
29. Id. at 726 (footnotes omitted).
30. A number of lower courts have, however, permitted claims by plaintiffs
against third party defendants in the absence of independent jurisdictional support.
See, e.g., Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697 (D. Kan. 1975); Davis v.
United States, 350 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Buresch v. American LaFrance,
290 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Pa. 1968); Myer v. Lyford, 2 F.R.D. 507 (M.D. Pa. 1942); Sklar
v. Hayes, 1 F.R.D. 594 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
31. Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417, 423 (8th Cir. 1977)
(quoting 3 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
14.27[11], at 14-569 (2d ed. 1974)), cert.
granted,98 S. Ct. 715 (1978) (No. 77-677).
32. See id. at 424-425. For a similar analysis, see Buresch v. American LaFrance,
290 F. Supp. 265, 267 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
33. 558 F.2d at 423 (quoting 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 14.2711], at 14-570
(2d ed. 1974)).
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Having found in Gibbs' expansion of pendent jurisdiction authorization for an expansion of ancillary jurisdiction, the Kroger
court had little difficulty justifying the assertion of jurisdiction over
Owen as a proper exercise of judicial discretion. First, had the action
been dismissed, the plaintiff might have been barred by Iowa's statute of limitations from asserting her claim against the third party
defendant in any court.3 Second, Owen had apparently violated the
rules of pleading by misleading the plaintiff into believing that diversity existed." Third, since the plaintiff was apparently not aware
of the lack of diversity between her and the third party defendant
until near the end of trial, 36 there was little possibility that she had
conspired with the original defendant to bring Owen under federal
jurisdiction.3 7 Finally, the motion to dismiss came after the parties
and the trial court had expended considerable energy on the controversy. Thus, even though the plaintiff's claim against the original
defendant had been dismissed prior to trial,3 1 the court considered
34. The trial court believed that, had the action been dismissed, Iowa's statute
of limitations would have precluded the plaintiff from proceeding in Iowa court. See
id. at 420. The Kroger majority declined to express an opinion on the matter, see id.
at 420 n.5, but Judge Bright, in his dissent, disagreed with the trial court's assessment.
Instead, he argued that Iowa's "savings statute" would have allowed the plaintiff to
bring her action in Iowa state court: "If, after the commencement of an action, the
plaintiff, for any cause except negligence in its prosecution, fails therein, and a new
one is brought within six months thereafter, the second shall, for the purposes herein
contemplated, be held a continuation of the first." IOWA CoDE § 614.10 (1971); see 558
F.2d at 432 & n.42. Moreover, it appears likely that the third party defendant would
have been estopped by his misconduct, see note 35 infra, from raising the statute of
limitations issue. See DeWall v. Prentice, 224 N.W.2d 428 (Iowa 1974).
35. See 558 F.2d at 419. Rule 8(b) provides that "[w]hen a pleader intends in
good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so
much of it as is true and material and deny only the remainder." The plaintiff's claim
against Owen described Owen as "'a Nebraska corporation with its principal place of
business in Nebraska.'" Id. Owen's answer admitted that it was "'a corporation
organized and existing under the Laws of the State of Nebraska'" and generally
denied all other allegations. Id. This use of a general denial, according to the Kroger
court, did not make clear to the plaintiff that Owen had admitted only half of plaintiff's jurisdictional averment. That Owen had pleaded in bad faith was demonstrated
by Owen's decision to wait until near the end of trial to raise the jurisdictional issue.
See id.
36. See id.
37. See generally sources cited in note 24 supra.
38. Though the dismissal of the original defendant from the action starkly illustrates the anomaly of the result in Kroger,see text accompanying notes 46-47 infra. it
was irrelevant to the decision. The question before the court was whether there was
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim against Owen. Clearly the dismissal of the original defendant could not have created jurisdiction over that claim. It is just as clear.
however, that jurisdiction, had it existed at the outset, would not have been impaired
by the dismissal. As the court noted,
"[g]enerally, in a diversity action, if jurisdictional prerequisites are satis-
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assertion of jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim against Owen to be
an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion."
Although Kroger's expansion of ancillary jurisdiction arguably
advances the interests of convenience, economy, and fairness to litigants,4" such considerations cannot alone sustain the court's decision
if it conflicts with the congressional policies embodied in the jurisdictional statutes." In Gibbs, the Court had no occasion to consider
statutory limits on federal jurisdiction because the statute upon
which jurisdiction was based dealt only with a federal cause of action
and implied no limitation on federal jurisdiction over pendent state
law claims. 2 By contrast, the statute upon which jurisdiction was
based in Kroger has been specifically construed to limit federal jurisdiction over state law claims through the requirement of complete
diversity of citizenship. 3 While courts faced with traditional Rule 14
fled when the suit is begun, subsequent events will not work an ouster of
jurisdiction. . . .This result is not attributable to any specific statute or to
any language in the statutes which confer jurisdiction. It stems rather from
the general notion that the sufficiency of jurisdiction should be determined
once and for all at the threshold and if found to be present then should
continue until final disposition of the action."
558 F.2d at 426 n.36 (quoting Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 808 (2d Cir. 1959)) (citations
omitted).
39. Most courts have regarded the issue of discretion over ancillary claims as
primarily dependent on considerations of convenience to litigants and judicial economy. See, e.g., Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 808 (2d Cir. 1959). By emphasizing the
egregious nature of the third party defendant's conduct, however, the court in Kroger
may have intended to suggest that considerations of economy and convenience will not
alone justify hearing claims by plaintiffs against third party defendants absent independent jurisdictional support. Unfortunately, the court did not articulate a general
standard to be applied in future cases involving plaintiff claims against nondiverse
third party defendants.
40. The benefits of convenience, economy, and fairness would have been more
readily apparent had the original defendant not been dismissed from the action prior
to trial. In cases where the original defendant remains in the action, dismissal of a
plaintiff's claim against a third party defendant may force the plaintiff and the third
party defendant to duplicate their efforts in state and federal court. As noted earlier,
however, the presence of the original defendant in the suit will not, even given the
stronger policy basis, materially affect the determination of whether the court has the
power to dispose of the claim. See note 38 supra.
41. See note 7 supra. See generally Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512
F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir. 1972) ("The value of efficiency in the disposition of lawsuits by
avoiding multiplicity may be readily conceded, but that is not the only consideration
a federal court should take into account in assessing the presence or absence of jurisdiction.").
42. See text accompanying note 63 infra. Indeed, it appears that by asserting
federal jurisdiction over a pendent state claim, the Court in Gibbs may have furthered
a congressional policy in favor of providing a convenient forum for the resolution of
federal claims. See Note, supra note 25, at 667-71.
43. See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
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actions involving a claim by an original defendant against a third
party defendant typically do not apply the rule of complete diversity
to the third party, that result is justified only because the third party
action is dependent upon resolution of the main claim." This justification cannot encompass claims, such as the plaintiff's claim against
the third party defendant in Kroger, that do not depend for their
resolution upon adjudication of the main claim. 5
As the dissent in Kroger noted,"6 had the plaintiff named Owen
as an original defendant, the case would have fallen under the precise
facts of Strawbridge v. Curtiss." The statutory issue presented in
Kroger, therefore, was whether allowing a Rule 14 claim by a plaintiff
against a nondiverse third party defendant violates a congressional
intent to maintain the rule of complete diversity in actions predicated
on diversity jurisdiction.
In assessing this question, it is important to note that Congress
has acquiesced in the complete diversity rule of Strawbridge v.
Curtiss for over 170 years." Such acquiescence on jurisdictional matters has, in other contexts, been interpreted as tacit endorsement of
settled statutory interpretation."9 The Court has also traditionally
ascribed to Congress an intention to restrict the reach of diversity
jurisdiction." Evidence of such an intent may be found in congressional action increasing the jurisdictional amount requirement to
$10,000,-5 imposing dual citizenship on corporations,2 and making
44. See note 21 supra.
45. Judge Bright, in his Kroger dissent, similarly distinguished Gibbs and the
Rule 14 cases. See 558 F.2d at 430; cf. Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir.
1977) (plaintiff in a state law negligence action not permitted to claim against a third
party defendant in the absence of independent jurisdictional support).
46. 558 F.2d at 430 (Bright, J., dissenting).
47. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
48. See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
49. For instance, in disallowing an attempted aggregation of claims to meet the
$10,000 jurisdictional requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). the Supreme Court declined-to alter its interpretation of the phrase "matter in controversy," reasoning that
"[wihere Congress has consistently re-enacted its prior statutory language. . . in the
face of a settled interpretation of that language, it is perhaps not entirely realistic to
designate the resulting rule a 'judge-made formula.'" Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332.
339 (1969).
50. "The dominant note in the successive enactments of Congress relating to
diversity jurisdiction, is one of jealous restriction .... City of Indianapolis v. Chase
Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76 (1941); see Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442 (1942); McCoy
v. Siler, 205 F.2d 498, 500-01 (3d Cir. 1953). But see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 n.6 (1967) ("Subsequent decisions of this Court indicate that
Strawbridge is not to be given an expansive reading.").
51. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970)). The increase in the jurisdictional amount requirement also
applied to federal question jurisdiction. Id. § 1 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970)).
52. Id. § 2 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970)); see note 5 supra.
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insurance firms doing business in states that permit direct actions
against insurers citizens of those states.53 These amendments to the
general diversity jurisdiction statute were enacted primarily to reduce the diversity caseload of federal courts.5" Moreover, Congress'
decision to allow only minimal diversity55 in certain limited situations, most notably in the areas of statutory interpleader" and removal, 57 suggests a congressional determination that the rule of complete diversity is to control in all other situations. 8 Taken together,
the evidence strongly suggests that the Kroger court's assertion of
jurisdiction contravenes a clear congressional policy to limit federal
diversity-based jurisdiction over state law claims.
That the federal courts cannot thus ignore potential statutory
roadblocks to any extension of jurisdiction was recently reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court in Aldinger v. Howard,5 9 a case dealing with pendent jurisdiction. In Aldinger, plaintiff brought suit against her supervisor under section 1983,1 ° alleging that she had been unconstitutionally deprived of her position in the county bureaucracy. Relying
on the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, plaintiff joined with her claim
against the supervisor a state law claim against the county.8 ' In ana53. Act of Aug. 14, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-439, § 1, 78 Stat. 445 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970)).
54. See S. REP. No. 1308, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19641 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2778; S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19581
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3099.
55. Minimal diversity, unlike complete diversity, requires only that there be
diversity of citizenship between at least one defendant and one plaintiff. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1) (1970) (jurisdiction exists whenever there are "Itiwo
or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship," asserting claims to the disputed
property).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1970) ("Whenever a separate and independent claim
... . which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more
otherwise nonremovable claims . . . .the entire case may be removed .... ").For
an example of how the operation of the removal statute may result in minimal diversity, see Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y.
1965). Plaintiff, a Delaware firm, brought action in state court against Richard Burton,
an alien, and Elizabeth Taylor, a United States citizen. A federal court would have
had original jurisdiction over the state law claim against Burton under section 1332,
but not over the state law claim against Taylor; although Taylor was a naturalized
American citizen, she was not a citizen of any state. Burton was permitted, however,
to invoke section 1441(c) to remove the entire action to federal court. This resulted in
minimal diversity: plaintiff and Burton were of diverse citizenship, but plaintiff and
Taylor were not. See note 55 supra.
58. See generally Bratton, Pendent Jurisdiction in Diversity Cases: Some
Doubts, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 296, 304-05 (1974).
59. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
61. Claims against political subdivisions of the state cannot be maintained under
section 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The state law claim in Aldinger
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lyzing the inclusion of the county as a "pendent party,"' 2 the Court
ruled that before jurisdiction can be asserted over such parties, "a
federal court must satisfy itself not only that Art. I permits [the
exercise of jurisdiction], but that Congress in the statutes conferring
jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication negated its existence." 63 Because Congress had not spoken on the general issue of
federal jurisdiction over pendent state law claims, the Gibbs Court
was free "to fashion its own rules under the general language of Art.
i."' In Aldinger, however, the statute upon which federal question
jurisdiction was based and without which plaintiff could not have
sued in federal court, did not authorize actions against local governments. In fact, in Monroe v. Pape,5 the Court had found in the
legislative history of section 1983 a specific congressional intent to
preclude such suits. 61 Given such an intent, the Court reasoned, the
plaintiff in Aldinger could not be permitted to do indirectly what she
was forbidden to do directly."7
Although Aldinger is clearly distinguishable on its facts from the
situation in Kroger,6" it is significant that, in finding an "implicit"
was founded on a state statute making the county vicariously liable for the torts of its
employees. See 427 U.S. at 4-5.
62. "Pendent party" jurisdiction is invoked by a plaintiff with a federal question
claim against one party and a state law claim growing out of the same core of operative
facts against another party. Jurisdiction over the latter party, often referred to as a
"pendent party," has been held to be governed by the doctrine of UMW v.Gibbs. See,
eg., Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809-11 (2d Cir. 1971);
Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971). See generally
Note, Federal Pendent Subject Matter Jurisdiction-TheDoctrine of United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs Extended to PersonsNot Partyto the Jurisdiction-ConferringClaim.
73 CoLum. L. REV. 153 (1973); see also notes 25-29 supra and accompanying text.
63. 427 U.S. at 18 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 15.
65. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
66. See id. at 187-91.
67. See 427 U.S. at 17.
68. The issue presented in Aldinger differs in a number of ways from the issue
presented in Kroger.First,Aldinger involved a party specifically immune from liability
under federal substantive law, not a party simply excluded from the reach of a jurisdictional statute. See generally Comment, The Impact of Aldinger v. Howard on Pendent
PartyJurisdiction,125 U. PA. L. REV. 1357 (1977). Second, the plaintiff in Aldinger
attempted to employ a theory of pendent jurisdiction to bring under federal jurisdiction a party who could not otherwise be brought before a federal court, while in Kroger
the court merely allowed the assertion of an additional claim against a party already
before the court. See generally Comment, FederalJurisdiction-IndependentSubject
Matter JurisdictionRequired When Plaintiff in Diversity Action Brings Direct Action
Against Nondiverse Third-PartyDefendant, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1388, 1395-96
(1977). Third, Aldinger was concerned with a politically sensitive problem: the liability
of county governments under section 1983. Thus, the Court may have been reluctant
to address the merits of the claim absent a clear indication that Congress intended to
confer jurisdiction on the federal courts. Given a less sensitive problem, such as the
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negation of jurisdiction, the Court in Aldinger relied on legislative
history that was far from compelling."s In fact, it appears that the
evidence of a congressional intent to require complete diversity in
cases arising under the general diversity jurisdiction statute is at least
as strong as that underlying the conclusion that Congress had foreclosed suits against municipalities."
Besides ignoring the statutory issues raised by a plaintiff's claim
against a nondiverse third party, the Krogercourt also failed to examine adequately the policy reasons for disallowing such claims. In addition to the danger of active collusion between plaintiffs and original
defendants,7 ' there is an equally serious danger that Kroger will encourage plaintiffs to engage in a more subtle form of forum shopping
since plaintiffs who can predict when diverse defendants will implead
nondiverse parties will be able to enjoy the benefits of collusion withone in Kroger, the Court might have been more willing to involve itself in the dispute
by asserting jurisdiction over a state law claim. Finally, the Court in Aldinger cautioned that "we decide here only the issue of so-called 'pendent party' jurisdiction with
respect to a claim brought under §§ 1343(3) and 1983. Other statutory grants and other
alignments of parties and claims might call for a different result." 427 U.S. at 18.
Nevertheless, Aldinger remains significant as the first Supreme Court decision to
explicitly recognize statutory constraints on pendent jurisdiction. See Comment. Aldinger v. Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction,77 COLUM. L. REV. 127 (1977). The recent
history of the Court suggests that this sensitivity to congressional limits on federal
jurisdiction will not be confined to section 1983 claims. See Tushnet, The New Law
on Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 663, 665-80 (1977). See also
Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. REv. 293, 315-22
(1976).
69. The conclusion that Congress intended to exclude state governments from
the reach, even indirectly, of the Civil Rights Act was based largely on Congress'
rejection of an amendment that would have made municipal corporations liable under
the Act. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 187-91 (1961), and City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511-13 (1973)).
The accuracy of the Court's construction of congressional intent has been seriously
questioned both generally and as applied to the facts in Aldinger. See Comment,
Aldinger v. Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction,supra note 68. See also Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 U.S.C. .§ 1983, 55 MINN. L. REv. 1201, 1203-07
(1971). Indeed, three Justices in Aldinger, while not disputing the assertion that
Congress may impose jurisdictional limitations beyond those found in the Constitution, disagreed with the Court's statutory analysis. They reasoned that Congress excluded local governments from the purview of the post-Civil War Civil Rights Act
because it questioned the constitutionality of imposing federal liability on local governments. There was nothing in the legislative history of the Act to suggest, however, that
Congress intended to preclude the exercise of federal jurisdiction over claims against
local governmental units where such claims had been specifically authorized by state
statute. See 427 U.S. at 23-24 (Brennan, J., joined by Blackmun & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting).
70. Compare notes 48-58 supra and accompanying text, with text accompanying
notes 65-67 supra, and note 69 supra. But cf. note 68 supra (noting policy distinctions
between Aldinger and Kroger).
71. See sources cited at note 24 supra.
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out actually conspiring with the original defendants. This type of
forum shopping both increases the burdens on federal courts and
third party defendants 7 2 and runs counter to a strong judicial policy
against circumvention of statutory limits on jurisdiction through the
use of artful devices. 73 Given these concerns, it would be better to
avoid adjudication of plaintiff claims against third party defendants
in the absence of independent jurisdictional support, particularly
where, as in Kroger, an alternative state forum is readily available."
For the reasons suggested above, the majority position requiring
an independent jurisdictional basis for claims by plaintiffs against
third party defendants represents the sounder policy. In cases such
as Kroger, where a third party's misconduct creates a situation in
which strict application of the statutory limits on jurisdiction may
produce undesirable or unjust results, the appropriate remedy is, as
the dissent in Kroger recognized, the imposition of sanctions against
the responsible parties, not the exercise of jurisdiction the court does
not possess.75

72. See generally Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977); Kenrose
Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1972); Note, Federal Pendent
Party Jurisdictionand United Mine Workers v. Gibbs-Federal Question and Diversity Cases, 62 VA. L. REv. 194 (1976).
Supporters of the Kroger position respecting plaintiff claims against third party
defendants have emphasized the ability of federal courts to use their discretionary
power to eliminate claims that might cause an undue burden to be placed on either
the court or the litigants. See e.g., Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of FederalAncillary
and Pendent Jurisdiction,33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 759 (1972); Note, Rule 14 Claims and
Ancillary Jurisdiction, 57 VA. L. REV. 265 (1971); Note, supra note 24. This view,
however, ignores the time and energy expended by courts and litigants in determining
which claims should, as a matter of discretion, be dismissed.
73. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1970) ("A district court shall not have jurisdiction
of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly
or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.").
74. See 558 F.2d at 432 (Bright, J., dissenting); note 34 supra.
75. As Judge Bright noted, there already exists authority for such sanctions. See
558 F.2d at 432. In Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 911 (10th Cir. 1974),
the Tenth Circuit assessed "all reasonable costs and expenses ... including a reasonable attorney's fee for work on this appeal" against a defendant who waited for an
advantageous time to disclose a jurisdictional defect.

